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Government-mandated agricultural cartels impose high costs on consumers
and harm Canada’s standing in international trade talks. A gradual phase-out
of supply management through sales of new quota offers a way out.
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GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC INSTITUTIONSCanadian dairy, poultry and egg farmers – the “supply managed” farm sector – account for
roughly 20 percent of annual sales in agriculture. Under the supply management system,
domestic producers are able to control the price and supply of their goods; production quotas
limit what leaves farms’ gates, and large tariffs block the entry into the country of similar
goods. 
While this government-mandated cartel allows producers to sell their goods for higher-than-
free-market prices, this comes at the expense of domestic consumers, new entrants and robust
competition. In international trade negotiations, Canada’s position is becoming all the time
more cumbersome: it aggressively defends supply management barriers while demanding
improved access to foreign markets for other domestically produced goods. 
Supply management policy in Canada is supported by producers and other vested interests.
But a move to a more market-oriented system offers benefits for consumers, a more
competitive food industry – and new revenue for fiscally challenged governments. 
Given the challenges that lie ahead, we suggest that Ottawa and the provinces begin a regular
auction of new quotas, gradually expanding the supply of agricultural production quotas over
a time horizon of 20 years. This should be coupled with the immediate elimination of direct
producer price administration. 
Eventually, increased supply from new domestic production would bring domestic producer
prices in line with competitive world prices. Our proposal would eventually phase out the
quota system, while protecting above-market producer profits for a 20-year period.
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S
ince the early 1970s, “supply
management” has subjected
Canadian dairy, poultry and egg
production – accounting for roughly
one-fifth of annual sales receipts in
Canadian agriculture – to government-
mandated cartels. 
Introduced to increase producer power vis-à-vis
intermediaries and consumers, and thus raise farm
incomes, supply management supports higher-than-
market prices by administering producer prices and
controlling farm output through production quotas,
while high tariffs prevent food processors and
consumers getting alternative supplies from abroad.1
Primary producers who received production
quotas at the outset, or bought them subsequently,
benefit from these schemes. Consumers, and much
of the domestic food industry, face higher-than-free-
market prices and a more limited selection of
products. As standard analysis of monopolies would
lead one to expect, these arrangements impose losses
on consumers that exceed the gains to producers:
society enjoys less of the supply-managed products
than would be the case in a free market.
The complexity of this system has increased over
time, and the context surrounding it has changed.
Initially, proponents feared that without supply
management there would be a decline of family-
sized farm production and significant vertical
integration. But these shifts have happened anyway,
in both supply-managed and other agricultural
sectors.
The main thrust of this policy – to ensure higher
incomes for producers than a free market would
support – is inconsistent with the general desire of
Canadians for quality goods at reasonable prices.
But it has not been an unmitigated success for
farmers. Government control of entry has blunted
competition, hampered innovation, and slowed
entrepreneurship. Premium prices for production
quotas make entry costs punishingly high for new
farmers. Supply management may be doing more
harm than good to new generations of farmers,
casting doubt on the system’s sustainability. 
The loss to society from these legally sanctioned
monopolies is, moreover, bigger than the apparent
gains to producers would suggest. Operating the
schemes, lobbying to maintain them, and jockeying
for advantage within them all absorb resources that
would otherwise be devoted to satisfying consumers.
From a fairness point of view, supply management
privileges a few insiders by imposing costs on larger
numbers of consumers, who are deprived of a wider
selection of products and price competition.
Furthermore, the system hurts the interests of
Canada as a trading nation by undercutting
Canada’s potential role as a positive force in
multilateral trade liberalization talks.
Other countries have looked at these defects and
dealt with them. New Zealand and Australia,
countries that pioneered marketing boards in the
1920s and 1930s, have largely abandoned the cartel
model.2Yet in Canada, the policy persists. Producers,
who have a very large stake in the system, are
concentrated in marginal ridings with political clout –
mainly rural regions in Ontario and Quebec
(Skogstad 2008). As well, the existence of artificial
shortages has generated other vested interests in the
production chain with a stake in the system’s
continuation. And very importantly, production
quotas have enormous market value – a fact that
inhibits abrupt abolition of the system, yet at the same
time suggests a route toward phasing it out over time.
In this paper, we propose a gradual expansion of
the supply of agricultural production quotas over an
horizon of 20 years, coupled with the immediate
elimination of direct producer price administration.
We expect that an increased supply of production
quotas will put downward pressure on their prices,
and this process should continue as producers of
supply-managed commodities adjust to a
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We thank Sylvain Charlebois, Michael Hart, Alex Laurin, Katie Macmillan, Karl Meilke, Finn Poschmann and Bob Seguin for comments and
discussion, and emphasize that we alone are responsible for the analysis and recommendations in this paper.
1 Canadians who might turn to foreign suppliers to escape the cartel encounter a tariff rate quota – a two-part tariff. A minimum access
commitment allows imports equal to around 5 percent of the quota amount, which is approximately 20 million kilograms in the case of cheese,
for example; imports above that amount attract a tariff of around 250 percent, on average (Barichello et al. 2009).
2 The authors’ use of the term “cartel” refers to the market outcomes from the operations of supply-management in Canada. Whereas The
Competition Act (Canada) prohibits agreements between producers to fix prices, allocate markets and restrict output, in the case of supply-
management it is the marketing boards that impose prices and quotas on everyone. | 2 Backgrounder 128
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competitive marketplace; one where the prices of
these commodities are set in the open market.
How the System Works
The initial allocation of quotas in the 1970s was
free; today, most farmers trade existing quotas to
one another through provincial exchanges. New
quotas are introduced when national bodies and
committees forecast demand to increase, as well as
under certain provincial new entrant programs, such
as the Dairy Farmers of Ontario’s New Entrant
Quota Assistance Program. National bodies – the
Canadian Dairy Commission, Chicken Farmers of
Canada, Egg Farmers of Canada, Turkey Farmers of
Canada, and Canadian Hatching Egg Producers –
oversee the overall system and the distribution of
quotas to each province. Provincial boards – for
instance, the Dairy Farmers of Ontario and the
Fédération des producteurs de lait du Québec,
which together account for about 80 percent of
Canadian dairy quotas – oversee the pricing of
supply-managed goods, the annual sale of quotas on
exchanges, and the enforcement of quota limits.3
Because they provide the right to produce a cartel-
controlled good – kilograms of fluid and industrial
milk in the dairy sector, kilograms of meat in the
poultry sector, and dozens of eggs for egg producers
– quotas are valuable. And because they can be
bought and sold, we can track their prices, which
reflect the capitalized value of future returns. 
Quotas Represent Sizeable Implicit Incomes for
Producers
Many factors determine a production quota’s value:
product prices; interest rates; changes in the market
for farm credit, such as increased willingness of
lenders to accept quota as collateral; perceptions of
risk; expected growth of demand; and assessments
of the likelihood of trade liberalization (see Box 1).4
At $28 billion in 2008, the aggregate value of
production quotas in Canada was up threefold
from 1995 (Table 1), with the average supply-
managed farm holding some $1.5 million worth of
production quota.5
Since the buying and selling of production
quotas is like any other business decision, we can
quantify the extra income associated with the right
to produce the goods they restrict. For farmers of
supply-managed products, the income associated
with owning a quota should be the same as the
return from investing in alternatives, including
financial instruments.6 One alternative would be
long-term federal government bonds – a relatively
risk-free investment with a yield of about 4 percent.
If quota holders held those instead, the resulting
income would have been some $1.1 billion in 2008
($28 billion multiplied by 4 percent). Another
alternative investment would be the average
weighted yield from long-term corporate bonds  – a
riskier proposition that pays a higher yield. That
alternative puts the 2008 income from quotas at
$1.6 billion ($28 billion multiplied by 5.6
percent).7
If the buyers of quotas see governments as likelier
to rescind their support for supply management
than to default on their debt on the one hand, and
likelier to support supply management than to bail
out businesses generally on the other, then the
investment risk they would see in quotas would be
somewhere between that on sovereign and
corporate debt. Hence, the implicit income from
quotas is probably between these two figures. On
its face, then, income from quotas is worth between
$1.1 and $1.6 billion annually to holders.
3 Barichello (2002) provides a detailed overview of supply management governance in Canada; Goldfarb (2009) does so specifically for the dairy sector.
4 Quota value rose when the World Trade Organization’s Uruguay Round came into effect in 1995. This increase may have occurred because previous
concerns that the Round would result in larger tariff reductions on supply-managed commodities had depressed prices, and when the conclusion of
the Round alleviated these concerns, farmers were willing to pay higher prices for quota.
5 To combat the negative effects of rising prices for dairy quotas, provincial dairy board have tried to cap them. In addition, a harmonized cross-
province quota system in being phased in to cap prices of quotas across provinces. At the time of writing, this has resulted in a dramatic fall in the
number of quotas offered for sale on the Ontario dairy quota exchange. 
6 Appendix B in Forbes et al. (1982) gives a clear microeconomic account of factors that can lead to over- and underestimation of estimates of
additional producer  profits from quota values. 
7 Farm Credit Canada presently allows quota as collateral for some loan offerings, placing quota in the same category – but not necessarily at the same
credit rating – as real estate as a backstop for credit. Backgrounder 128 | 3
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Year Supply Managed Quotas Dairy Quotas Poultry and Egg Quotas
($ Billions)
1995 9.6 7.6 2.0
1997 11.0 9.2 1.9
1999 16.2 13.6 2.7
2001 17.4 14.1 3.4
2002 20.6 16.2 4.4
2003 22.3 17.6 4.7
2004 24.3 19.4 4.8
2005 24.8 19.3 5.5
2006 24.8 19.3 5.6
2007 27.8 20.7 7.1
2008 28.2 21.0 7.2
Average Annual Growth                                                         (percent)
1995-2008 11.4 10.7 13.9
Table 1: Aggregate Quota Prices on Upward Trend, 1995 to 2008
Source: Statistics Canada Canadian Financial Farm Database.
The value of quota – the right to produce a cartelized
good – is the discounted value of the future net income
its purchaser expects from owning it. Following Barichello
(1996), we can decompose the value of quota in parallel
fashion to the valuation of a perpetual annuity:
Quota Price = R*(1-d)/(r + d - g) 
Where R = the annual net return of the quota (price
less marginal costs)
d = a default risk factor
r = the interest rate
g = the growth rate of the annual net return.
This formula formalizes several intuitive points:
￿ With regard to risk, for example, expectations of
policy changes that would undermine the cartel –
e.g., because of international trade negotiations –
would raise the implicit value of d, and the quota
price would fall.
￿ Quota value is negatively correlated with the
market interest rate. If the cost of borrowing falls,
for example – or, alternatively, if the returns
available on alternative investments fall – the price
of a quota will rise.
￿ Expected growth in the market for supply-
managed commodities will affect the value of
quota. To the extent that the cartel raises prices for
milk, chickens and eggs, for example, expected
growth in consumption will fall as processors and
consumers substitute other goods, limiting the
extent to which the higher price boosts quota
value.
An additional consideration would be expectation of a
government buyout (Barichello et al. 2009). In this
case, an additional term, d*E(x), where E(x) is the
expected terminal value of a quota in any given period,
would also appear in the quota price equation.
Box 1: Understanding a Quota’s Value| 4 Backgrounder 128
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Yet Producers of Supply-Managed Products
Benefit Relatively Little
As noted already, monopolies or cartels create net
losses: producers enjoy benefits smaller than the
costs imposed on consumers.
One hint that the net benefits to producers are
less than the implicit income estimates suggest is
available by comparing the implicit incomes to the
before-tax operating income of farms producing
supply-managed commodities, as in Figure 1. The
implicit income from quotas, when calculated at
either the sovereign-risk yield or when valued at the
weighted average corporate-bond yield has been
consistently near or above net operating income.
Treating the mid-point of these two estimates as a
definitive figure, moreover, shows that the implicit
income from quotas has tended to remain steady
relative to net operating revenues, and rise relative
to net operating income, from 119 percent in 1995
to 126 percent in 2007. If producers were enjoying
extraordinary profits from the cartel system, one
would expect net incomes to be larger than in other
businesses by an amount equal to the implicit
income from quotas. But they are not: the higher
revenues generated by the cartel system’s restriction
of supply are not reflected in the bottom line
because the system also generates costs, many of
which likely increase over time.
One obvious cost is the debt charges farmers pay
when they purchase a quota with borrowed funds.
For instance, publicly available figures suggest that
an entry-level quota represents around 75 percent
of start-up costs for commercial chicken farming.8
8 See the Tobacco Transitions website for farmers of Oxford, Elgin, Norfolk and Brant Counties in Ontario:























Returns from Holding Government of Canada Bonds
Returns from Holding Corporate Bonds
Figure 1: High Annual Returns to Quotas: Supply-Managed Net Operating Income* vs. Alternative
Investment Returns, 1998 to 2008
Note: Net Operating Income includes capital cost allowances in expenses. 
Sources: Statistics Canada Canadian Financial Farm Database, and authors’ calculations.Although tradable quotas provide one avenue for
more efficient operators to displace less efficient
ones, high entry-level costs give incumbents a leg
up on would-be entrants (Turvey et al. 1995),
weakening competitive pressure. The system
inflates other costs as well: past producer gains have
likely been capitalized into land prices, for example,
further raising barriers to entry, and inhibiting the
transfer of land and other assets to more productive
uses outside the supply-managed sector. 
A more subtle cost to producers and to society
involves the resources producers use in lobbying
governments to maintain and tighten the system, or
to promote their own interests within it. To invest in
activities related to the operations of the cartel makes
sense for farmers as individual entrepreneurs, but the
frictions from protecting these interests raise costs for
the sector as a whole, reducing the profitability of
farms and absorbing resources that could be used for
other purposes, such as making farms more efficient
and environmentally sustainable, or giving
consumers better, healthier food.9
Innovations that would otherwise be welcomed
for expanding consumer choice – new milk
products or substitutes for making ice cream,
yogurt and cheese, for example – threaten the cartel
system. When domestic milk prices are much
higher than their international counterparts, food
producers have incentives to import processed
goods and substances that are not classified as dairy
at the border – such as ice cream with enough sugar
content to qualify as a sugar product, not a dairy
product. In response, federal authorities have been
expanding the list of prohibited products and
tightening border controls to keep them out. The
adverse impact of supply-management on the
competitiveness of Canadian food manufacturers
prompted a “Special Class Permit System” in 1995,
which allows purchasers of industrial milk for use
in dairy products, or purchasers of processed dairy
products, to access different prices depending on
end use. Food processors, for example, are
sometimes allowed to buy cheaper Canadian cheese
for use in exported frozen meals. This has created a
whole new arena for lobbying and conflict over
limited access to cheaper imports.
The restriction of sales of product or quotas
across provincial boundaries further raises costs and
generates friction.10 Some commentators and
tribunals have argued that the considerable
regulatory and revenue-raising powers governments
have delegated to marketing boards are not
accompanied by appropriate governance structures,
transparency and accountability.11The unique
focus on producer interests is overt in the case of
the Canadian Dairy Commission, of which the
Chairman, CEO and an additional Commissioner
– appointed by the Minister of Agriculture – are all
former dairy farmers (Charlebois et al. 2007).
The Case for Reform Now
Frustratingly, the large implicit income from
owning quotas compared to the operating incomes
of farms producing supply-managed commodities
both testifies to the inefficiency of the system and
underlines the incentive for farmers to maintain it.
One straightforward interpretation of these figures
would be that without a cartel, the sector would
make much lower returns, and maybe losses. While
producers are acutely conscious of their short-term
interest in maintaining the system, consumers tend
to be less aware of its costs, which are spread across
a much larger population than are the benefits to
producers.12The November 2009 report by the
House Committee on International Trade, which
insisted that Canada make no concessions in
negotiations at the World Trade Organization or in
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
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9 Hart (2005) documents the extraordinary improvements in quality of Canadian wine – once a byword for undrinkability – after the Canada-US
Free Trade Agreement prompted progressive deregulation of the sector, and argues that the same improvements could be expected following an end
to supply management in dairy and poultry. 
10 New dairy quota is usually distributed on a pro-rata basis, where Ontario and Quebec represent about 80 percent of Canadian dairy quota
holdings. The fine details of dairy quota distribution are, however, so complex that space does not permit a full discussion (Barichello 2002).
11 On the former point, see Quebec (2008, 79-80); on the latter, “Tribunal orders milk quota fee refunded,” The Globe and Mail, 26 June 2008, B8.
12 A recent survey found that although roughly 70 percent of individuals surveyed consume milk daily, a similar proportion did not know that milk is
more expensive in Canada than in the United States. A majority of those surveyed had not heard of the Canadian Dairy Commission and did not
know what it does (Charlebois et al. 2007). | 6 Backgrounder 128
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13 See Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 21-016-XWE.
14 Supply management forces Canada into a mercantilist trade stance that is increasingly anachronistic. Dymond and Hart (2008) explain how commodity-
oriented protectionism undermines economic development in a world where production chains are increasingly integrated across national borders.
15 Perverse effects abound. With regard to free-range eggs, one producer colourfully observes that the monopoly blocks new, innovative products: “If
consumers could taste the alternative, they’d want more.” The upshot is a black market in these eggs – which, by its nature, is not subject to the
same health safeguards as the mainstream product. Globe and Mail, February 24, 2010 “Crackdown!” Page L2. 
16 See, for example, Herman (2007). Differences over agriculture led to the July 2008 negotiation collapse of the Doha round of trade negotiations.
Canada was once a foremost participant in liberalization: now, its support of supply management has made it all but irrelevant. 
17 For instance, its role in enforcing supply management appears to have discouraged Ottawa from signing onto the 2006 Interim Agreement on
Internal Trade in Agriculture and Food Goods.
its talks with the European Union, was a discour-
aging reminder that producer interests vastly
outweigh consumer interests in current trade
liberalization deliberations.
Notwithstanding this discouraging configuration
of forces, there are good arguments for reforming
the system, and doing so sooner rather than later.
To begin with, there is the simple accumulation of
evidence supporting well-known arguments against
monopolies and cartels in general. The adverse
consequences of supply management have been
documented over more than three decades
(Borcherding and Dorosch 1981, Forbes et al.
1982, Lippert 2001, Stanbury 2002, Goldfarb
2009). Between 1995, when the Bank of Canada
began targeting 2 percent inflation, and November
2009, the overall consumer price index rose 32
percent. The prices of all food purchased from
stores rose 39 percent over that period, while prices
for poultry, dairy and eggs rose 61, 51 and 54
percent, respectively. The statistics for dairy, the
most important cartel-controlled product, tell a
story of an industry in both economic and political
decline. Production has never regained its pre-
1970s peak; per person consumption of milk has
been falling 1 percent annually since the late 1980s,
and the number of farms producing milk has
plummeted by nearly 60 percent since 1992. Any
arguments that milk, eggs, chicken and turkey
might be extraordinary products to which ordinary
economics do not apply get no support from this
experience – so policy motivated by the public
good should not continue to heed them.
As for timing, the distortions created by supply
management are worsening as the system
entrenches. The importance of supply management
to farm balance sheets has increased steadily since
the early 1980s: quotas amounted to around 4
percent of total equity in 1982, but had surpassed
11 percent by 2008.13To the extent that farmers
are borrowing against the value of quotas, the cartel
is generating political risk for financial institutions,
and creating a further vested interest in the
maintenance of a damaging system. Delaying
action, to be blunt, does not help.
Moreover, in a world where production is
increasingly integrated across borders – a trend
affecting food as well as other products –
restrictions on production and imports do
increasingly visible damage. Responses to that
damage generate newer, more complex tensions.14
Granting access to low-priced imports only to
certain food processors, for example, hurts other
food processors and businesses such as restaurants
that do not gain such access. High prices for dairy
products increase the incentives to use non-dairy
substitutes, which other considerations – including
health effects – might otherwise discourage.15 As
well, the need to maintain quantitative limits and
prohibitive tariffs has neutralized Canada’s
traditionally pro-liberalization stance in
international trade negotiations, hampering our
pursuit of other national interests.16 Even within
Canada, the federal government’s devotion to these
programs has inhibited it from supporting
provincial initiatives to remove internal barriers.17
A further motivation for action in the near term
is different: current economic and fiscal stresses
make the economic distortions caused by supply
management even less tolerable than in more
prosperous times. For governments to sanction and
enforce monopolies that raise the prices of basic
foodstuffs at a time when Canadians generally are
feeling an economic pinch makes no sense. 
Producers also have long-term interests – such as
succession plans and the well-being of new
generations of farmers – that could breathe life into
the potential for reforms. The current system may,Backgrounder 128 | 7
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18 Reforms that are similar in principle could be applied to the poultry and egg sectors and boost revenues available for government. In line with this soft-
landing approach, we are also supportive to the option of an extended buyout with a two-quota system, each associated with a different milk price.
This option would involve a gradual, targeted decline in domestic prices of supply-managed goods, and give producers the option to trade-in old
quotas – perhaps at existing prices – for new quotas conferring the right to produce at the uncontrolled price. Consumers would face only the pooled
and gradually declining price, set according to a predetermined schedule (Barichello et al. 2009). Where producer compensation is deemed necessary, a
time-limited levy on consumers can subsidize producers during the change, as occurred in the case of Australia’s dairy reforms. 
19 These higher tariffs that apply to imorts above the minimum access commitment are often higher than needed to keep out foreign goods – a
situation often described as “water in the tariff.” In our proposal, initial over-quota tariff reductions would reduce the water in the tariff, after
which more controlled reductions would maintain domestic prices until the end of the program.  
20 Advance announcement of the program would allow adjustment by lenders against quota, who would wish to either reduce their exposure or
obtain different collateral for their loans. 
21 Similar to today, where the Canadian Dairy Commission uses surplus purchases of butter and skim milk powder to help determine the level of consumer
demand, smooth consumption seasonality, and set producer prices, this mechanism could be kept in place to facilitate a transition to lower farm-gate
prices and higher production. But the formal price administration pillar of the system would be abandoned by letting quota supply dictate prices.
in the eyes of old producers, seem to have served
them well; however, years of bureaucratic barriers to
entry and cost escalation have made current
producers apparently more dependent on high
tariffs to protect them from foreign competition
than their predecessors were. Long-term benefits of
competitive markets, such as productivity
enhancements and competitiveness, are inevitably
secondary to the competition-limiting imperatives
in supply-managed systems. 
A Proposal for Regular Auction of New Quotas
Incremental reforms are possible. A small step
would be to make pricing formulas more
transparent, and make the production cost of the
most efficient producers the most influential – if
not the only – variable in determining prices.
Winding down similar monopolies elsewhere has
involved buy-outs of old quotas or liberalization
accompanied by temporary subsidies, which can be
financed by taxation and/or levies on consumers.
At a time when the economic slump and bailouts
have pushed government budgets deep into the red,
however, a different approach merits attention. By
sanctioning these monopolies, governments have
created an artificial asset that has value. Since they
are now hungry for revenue, why not monetize this
asset: sell more quotas?
Governments selling property created by
regulation is a familiar spectacle: recent auctions of
electromagnetic spectrum for purposes such as
wireless communication have raised substantial
revenues. Unlike the creation of property rights in
electromagnetic spectrum, however, which has the
public-good benefit of limiting interference among
different users of the same frequencies, restriction of
the ability to produce supply-managed goods
produces a net loss to society. So a scheme to expand
production of supply-managed goods should aim to
eliminate this loss over time – reaping additional
revenues for governments until supply has expanded
to meet demand and prices for previously cartelized
goods are set in the open market. 
For simplicity, consider how a 20-year program
to sell new quotas at a pre-announced pace and
transition to a market system could work for dairy
farmers – Canada’s largest supply managed group.18
In broad outline, the program could involve
coordinated sales of quotas under the auspices of
each provincial agency, with the provinces receiving
the revenue. The production-cost formula for
administering producer prices – a largely
unnecessary pillar to ensure domestic market price
control – for fluid and industrial milk would be
abandoned, and the federal government would
phase its tariffs out over the life of the program.19,20
Over time, the increased supply from new
domestic production would bring the domestic
producer prices into line with world prices.
Demand for dairy products would rise, and
producers would continue to be paid from a pooled
price scheme.21 A simple illustration follows. 
To determine the price impact from issuing new
quotas each year, we assume that producer prices
fall at roughly three and a half times the rate at
which supply increases, in line with observed| 8 Backgrounder 128
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22 This corresponds to estimates of price elasticity of demand for fluid milk, around -0.25 to -0.40.
23 Canada wide, the production quota amounts to around 300 million kg of butterfat/year (Goldfarb 2009). 
responses to price changes.22To benchmark the
amount supply must increase to lower the returns
from owning quota, we use the difference between
Canada’s producer prices and the world market
reference price. This reflects the gap between
current and true market prices. Today, domestic
producer prices are assumed to be roughly 2.5
times greater than market prices.
We then choose a level of additional quotas to be
issued annually – above necessary changes for
population, and at an increasing rate – to drive the
difference between domestic and world prices to
nothing by 2029, which would mean that the price
of quotas falls to zero. An auction of 0.4 percent of
today’s total quota23 – about 1.2 million kg of
butterfat – that rises to 16 million kg of butterfat
by 2029 should ensure gradually declining, above-
market returns. 
Were the dairy system reprogrammed to expire in
20 years there would be an initial, unavoidable
reduction in total quota value, resulting in a balance
sheet adjustment for dairy farmers. At a discount rate
of 4 percent, access to only 20 years of protected
markets and decreasing returns to quotas, there
Additional quota to
Quota be auctioned Above market Revenue from
Year value ($M) (million kg butterfat/year) returns ($M) quota sale ($M)
2009E 21,003 0.0 1,015* 0
2010 10,325 1.2 996 35
2011 9,328 1.2 940 31
2012 8,389 1.2 885 28
2013 7,504 1.3 833 26
2014 6,671 1.4 782 23
2015 5,888 1.5 734 21
2016 5,155 1.6 686 19
2017 4,469 1.8 639 18
2018 3,830 2.0 593 16
2019 3,237 2.3 547 15
2020 2,690 2.6 501 13
2021 2,188 3.0 455 12
2022 1,734 3.5 408 10
2023 1,326 4.2 359  8
2024 967 5.1 308  7
2025 659 6.2 254  5
2026 405 7.6 197  3
2027 208 9.5 137  1
2028 71 12.1 71  0
2029 0 15.5 0  0
Total – 84.7 11,340 293
Table 2: Predicted Aggregate Quota Values, Quota Issues, and Revenues from Quota Auctions under
Proposed Reforms, 2009E to 2029
* This initial implicit income value corresponds to the calculations performed earlier in the paper as explained in Box 1.
Note: Each unit of quota permits a farmer to produce one kg of butterfat per day. Total national quota production equals roughly 300 million kilograms of
butterfat per year. At 305 kg of butterfat of annual production per unit of quota, roughly 980,000 units of quota exist nationally.
Source: Authors’ calculations.Backgrounder 128 | 9
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24 Report of the Commission on the Future of Agriculture and Agrifood in Québec (2008, 15).
would be an immediate drop in total dairy quota
value from $21.0 to around $10.3 billion. This
sizeable drop occurs because quota values would now
reflect a limited time horizon of diminishing superior
returns. Future quota values would fall to below $3.2
billion by 2020 and approach zero by the end of the
20-year period (Table 2). 
Above market returns would remain robust for
dairy farmers in the short- and medium-term,
however, and the gradual schedule of quota expansion
would leave around $11.3 billion in guaranteed
profits for producers, in discounted terms. Because
an annual auction of new quotas could raise roughly
$0.3 billion in provincial government revenues over
the next 20 years, however, some funds would be
available to cushion the blow – to provide transition
packages to those dairy farmers who may decide to
leave the business, for example. 
Maintaining producer milk prices above market
levels for a limited period would encourage the
more efficient producers to purchase more quotas
today and reap privileged market returns. Yet, the
fact that quota values would decline over time
would pressure producers to devise strategies for
working without quota supports – becoming more
customer-focused and entrepreneurial, and perhaps
even export, as their Australian dairy counterparts
did in spectacular fashion after their system
changed. If new quotas were transferable across
provincial boundaries, such a program could ease
the fragmentation the current system imposes on
Canada’s internal market. 
Conclusion
It is easy to be pessimistic about the prospects for
reforming supply management. The favourable
features of the system come at no great expense to
government, but are passed along in higher and
annually increasing consumer costs. Producers in a
cartel, like those who enforce it and vested interests
further along the supply chain, have short-run
interests in maintaining their privileged position.
Further, each vote in rural ridings has more clout
than each vote in heavily populated urban ridings,
making reform difficult. That said, the interests of
the next generation of actual and would-be
producers may work with consumer interests to
bring about a market-oriented approach to these
key agricultural sectors.
The costs of the system are mounting – both
domestically and in Canada’s international
relations. It is neither responsible nor realistic to
assume it can continue indefinitely. Since the
inception of supply management in the 1970s, the
number of farms producing milk for sale has
shrunk by 85 percent. As the 2008 Report of the
Commission on the Future of Agriculture and
Agrifood in Québec observed:
“Either the agriculture and agrifood sector … opens
its systems to innovation and entrepreneu-rial
initiatives, or certain changes will happen by
themselves, due to current circumstances, new
consumer trends, and competition from other
products from home and abroad. And if competi-
tion forces our hand, the changes will probably occur
in chaos and stress, with plant closings, bankruptcies,
social controversy, and human tragedy.”24
A gradual but significant expansion of supply
through annual quota auctions and tariff-rate quota
liberalization provides a path for reform that avoids
massive short-run trauma, but would be
revolutionary in the long run. New producers and
processors, and existing ones constrained by the
current system’s rigidities, would bring new and
better products to the market. A major impediment
to freer internal and international trade would
disappear. Governments, moreover, would reap
additional revenues during a time when they are
badly needed – revenues that would not hurt
economic performance as new taxes would do, but
would accompany a beneficial liberalization.
Canada has shown itself able, time and again, to
grapple successfully with major economic policy
challenges. Other sectors, such as telecommuni-
cations and transportation, have undergone major
liberalizations and emerged more dynamic in their
wake. On the agriculture and agrifood front,
progressive deregulation and trade liberalization
turned Canada’s wine industry from a laughingstock
to a winner of international awards. A similar change
is long overdue for Canadian milk, poultry and eggs.| 10 Backgrounder 128
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